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When a multi-plant firm must close one unit due to declining demand it can choose between 
two alternatives. On the one hand, the firm can announce a certain span of time in which the 
plants are evaluated according to relative performance with the least performing plant being 
shut down in the end (shutdown contest). On the other hand, the firm can use given 
information on the plants’ productivities and close the least productive unit. This paper 
analyzes the selection and incentive properties of both alternatives. Multi-plant firms often 
operate in an international industry. Hence, in a second step we discuss the effects of 
governmental support for domestic plants on selection efficiency. 
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In the 1990s, General Motors (GM) announced to shut down 21 unnamed
plants in the next years.1 After the announcement, the plants enter a collec-
tive tournament with the tournament losers being shut down. The incentives
to survive lead to signi￿cant extra e⁄orts by all GM factories. In particular,
at the end there was a head-to-head competition between the plants in Wil-
low Run (Michigan) and Arlington (Texas). Further closing rounds followed.
For example, in November 2005, GM Chief Executive O¢ cer Rick Wagoner
declared shutdown of nine plants by 2008.2 In June 2009, GM ￿led for bank-
ruptcy and published a list of 14 plants and three service centers that will
be closed by 2012.3 Moreover, three locations were set on standby with the
option of re-opening when demand goes up. At least one of them will be
re-opened when a new small car will be built; however, GM did not specify
which of them.
At that time, GM￿ s European subsidiary Opel still faced an uncertain
future. An intensive public debate arose on how many and which plants
should be closed, whether Opel should be sold and whether the single Euro-
pean governments should try to help their locations to survive. In 2009, the
German government strongly favored selling of Opel to Magna International
and o⁄ered ￿nancial aid for the German locations of Opel.4 Other European
countries become concerned that Germany might protect its domestic plants
at the costs of others. The European Commission even publicly warned
against protectionism. In November 2009, GM declared not to sell Opel and
to keep alive all four German plants, expecting governmental aid up to $5
billion. Further European countries like Spain and Britain also promised
￿nancial aid to rescue jobs in their domestic plants. In January 2010, GM
proclaimed closing of the Opel plant in Antwerp (Belgium).5
Besides the case of GM, there are many other examples where a multi-unit
1See Ward￿ s Auto World (1992) cited by Drago, Garvey and Turnbull (1996).
2See Associated Press (2005).
3See, for example, Bunkley (2009), Hargreaves (2009).
4See Dempsey (2009), Jolly and Dempsey (2009).
5See Jolly (2010).
2￿rm plans to close one or several establishments due to declining demand.6
In all these cases, the ￿rm has to decide between two di⁄erent strategies
￿it can announce either a certain number of unnamed plants that will be
shut down after a ￿xed period (like GM in the 1990s) or a concrete list of
plants to be closed (like GM in 2009). Both strategies have advantages but
also potential drawbacks. The ￿rst strategy allows the ￿rm to organize a
collective tournament between the plants in order to close the tournament
losers (i.e., the most underperforming plants during the evaluation period).
Such shutdown contests elicit extra incentives from the plants￿workforces
since neither worker wants to lose his job. Often, the closing of a plant
dramatically increases the local rate of unemployment in a certain region
and, thus, decreases the workers￿outside options. This e⁄ect would further
enhance overall incentives in the collective tournament. As a potential draw-
back, at the end of the tournament period the ￿rm may observe that the less
productive units have performed far better than the more productive ones,7
resulting into ine¢ cient plant closing. The second strategy ￿announcing an
explicit list of shutdowns ￿would ensure closing of the least productive units
at the cost of zero extra incentives since there is no tournament.8
In this paper, we use a model with two plants that di⁄er in productivity
to analyze the circumstances under which the ￿rm prefers either strategy.
In addition, we discuss the possibility that the ￿rm is able to separate se-
lection and incentive issues, that is the ￿rm shuts down the less productive
plant for sure, but installs a collective tournament as a pure incentive device.
From society￿ s perspective, we address the consequences of the ￿rm￿ s strat-
6For example, in July 2008, Starbucks announced to close 600 of its underperforming
shops. In January 2010, the large European drugstore chain Schlecker (with 13,200 shops
in 12 European countries) proclaims to shut down 500 locations.
7For example, low-productive plants may employ workers with poor quali￿cations and
bad outside options. Especially these workers should have very high incentives to win the
plant-closing contest.
8Note that both strategies have the disadvantage that announcing future plant closing
may induce high-talented workers to change their employer. In our paper, we abstract
from this problem. It can be more severe under either strategy. An unnamed list of plants
implies that any worker of any ￿rm has a certain incentive to search for a new job, while
a concrete list of plant closings gives a reduced number of workers very strong incentives
to change their current employer.
3egy choice on the likelihood of a selection failure (i.e., the more-productive
plant is closed). In a next step, we consider a setting where the two plants
are located in di⁄erent countries and the respective governments can choose
actions to protect its domestic plant. The governments can either directly
bid for the decision right which plant to close (e.g., by o⁄ering the ￿rm a
lump-sum payment as ￿nancial aid conditional on the survival of the domes-
tic plant) or, if banned by an international competition authority, indirectly
support the domestic plant during the shutdown contest (e.g., by a public
contract that increases plant pro￿ts).9 We investigate how such governmental
intervention in￿ uences selection e¢ ciency when one of the two heterogeneous
plants must be closed.10
Our results show that if the ￿rm organizes a tournament between the two
plants in order to shut down the loser, the impact of plant size on workers￿
collective e⁄ort and, hence, on a plant￿ s winning probability depends on three
e⁄ects. First, the larger the size of a plant the lower will be the individual
incentives of the workers according to the free-rider e⁄ect. Second, due to
the plants￿concave production technologies and the workers￿convex cost-of-
e⁄ort functions, the more workers are employed by a certain plant the lower
should be an individual￿ s contribution to the workforce￿ s collective e⁄ort.
Therefore, this technology e⁄ect goes in the same direction as the free-rider
e⁄ect. Third, the larger a plant the more workers will contribute a certain
amount of e⁄ort which increases overall e⁄ort supply (quantity e⁄ect). When
the free-rider e⁄ect and the technology e⁄ect dominate the quantity e⁄ect,
the low-productive plant will be more likely to win the collective tourna-
ment if it is su¢ ciently small. On the one hand, lower outside options of
the workers that are employed by the low-productive plant also increase the
likelihood of a selection failure. On the other hand, higher bargaining power
and higher regular pro￿ts of the high-productive plant decrease the proba-
9Anecdotal evidence again comes from the case of Opel. In 2009, the German govern-
ment ordered 1,101 cars worth 20.5 million euro from their domestic Opel plants, which
should be used as sta⁄ cars. In 2010, additional 1,046 cars have been ordered from Opel
by the German government.
10Note that even within a country we may have a similar situation if plants are located
in di⁄erent regions belonging to di⁄erent regional governments.
4bility of a selection failure. Moreover, we have the following trade-o⁄: If the
high-productive plant has a large winning probability, selection failures will
be rather unlikely. In these situations, the ￿rm will favor the use of a collec-
tive tournament to generate extra incentives for both plants. However, this
preference just allows for a positive selection failure, which could be excluded
if not relying on a collective tournament.
Theoretically, the ￿rm can use the waiting period before executing plant
closure to organize a collective tournament without linking the selection deci-
sion to the outcome of the tournament. In other words, the ￿rm can announce
to shut down the low-productive plant after this period and independently
design optimal tournament prizes to induce incentives for the two plants.
This alternative guarantees selection e¢ ciency but eliminates extra incen-
tives from closing the tournament loser. The results show that in case of
unlimited liability the ￿rm always prefers to separate selection and incentive
issues in this way, even if the tournament winner is not veri￿able so that
one plant is induced to choose ine¢ ciently small e⁄orts whereas the other
plant chooses more than e¢ cient e⁄ort. However, if workers are protected by
limited liability and the winner of the collective tournament is veri￿able, the
￿rm will still link plant closing to the tournament outcome given that the
plants￿regular pro￿ts do not di⁄er to much. The larger the high-productive
plant￿ s bargaining power the more likely the ￿rm adheres to its plant-closing
contest. Intuitively, in that case most of the e¢ ciency gains are distributed
to the workers so that the ￿rm is less interested in selection e¢ ciency.
The third part of the paper deals with the problem of governmental in-
tervention, using the initial two-period model where both plants are active
in the ￿rst period but one plant is closed in the second period. The ￿rm
will always demand higher ￿nancial aid from the government with the less
productive plant since keeping this plant alive in the second period would
unambiguously harm the ￿rm. However, if the respective government￿ s costs
for unemployed workers are su¢ ciently large relative to the ￿rm￿ s second-
period loss in regular pro￿ts from closing the more-productive plant, the
government of the low-productive plant will win the bidding process. Since
expected unemployment costs increase in plant size and decrease in the work-
5ers￿reemployment probabilities, a selection failure due to governmental in-
tervention will particularly occur if the low-productive plant is rather large
and part of a distressed labor market. When direct bidding for plant closing
is prohibited by a competition authority, governments may still support their
plants during the collective tournament via indirect subsidies. Now plant size
may work into the opposite direction. If the low-productive plant is so large
that the free-rider e⁄ect becomes dominant, the respective government will
decide against subsidizing. It will better save money since it anticipates that
the domestic plant￿ s workforce will not really ￿ght in the tournament due to
individual free riding.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
related work. Section 3 introduces the basic model, which abstracts from
governmental intervention. In Section 4, the model is solved. Section 5,
addresses the possibility of separating selection and incentive issues. Section
6 focuses on governmental intervention. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, there are par-
allels to the work on collective tournaments. Drago, Garvey and Turnbull
(1996) point out that there exists a spread between winner and loser prize
that induces ￿rst best e⁄orts for all heterogeneous workers in a collective
tournament with two plants. G￿rtler (2006) shows that in the optimal con-
tract the principal will only use this spread and implement ￿rst-best incen-
tives if workers are not protected by limited liability. Marino and Zabojnik
(2004) discuss pro￿t sharing in teams and tournament competition between
these teams as a possible solution to the free-rider problem. If a collective
tournament between teams is optimal, then the ￿rm has strong incentives
to choose a multidivisional organization with competing divisions. G￿rtler
(2008) considers a situation where workers have the possibility to win the
collective tournament by investing in both productive e⁄ort and counterpro-
ductive e⁄ort that harms the opposing team (sabotage). Since the teams￿
production technologies are concave and exhibit strict complementarities,
6each team optimally concentrates its sabotage activities against the least
productive member of the opposing team. Finally, there is a large literature
on group rent-seeking contests; for an overview see Konrad (2009, 124￿ 131).
The second strand of the related literature addresses the problem of plant
closing in declining industries. Part of this literature especially investigates
the situation of multi-plant ￿rms. The theoretical work focuses on the roles
of production costs and plant size. While all models clearly show that ￿
within a given class of plant size ￿less pro￿table plants exit ￿rst, the papers
o⁄er partially mixed results on the impact of size. According to Ghemawat
and Nalebu⁄ (1985), exit occurs in decreasing order of plant size. However,
Whinston (1988) shows that this result does not generally hold in the case
of multi-plant ￿rms. Reynolds (1988) analyzes optimal plant closing of two
multi-unit duopolists. If the two ￿rms have the same number of plants, they
will ￿rst shut down the least pro￿table ones. If the ￿rms do not di⁄er too
much in pro￿tability but have di⁄erent numbers of plants, the ￿rm with the
smaller number will begin to close its plants.
Empirical studies on plant closing within multi-unit ￿rms also identify
size and pro￿tability as most important selection criteria. Lieberman (1990)
considers the U.S. chemical industry. In case of multi-plant ￿rms, small
plants have a higher probability to be shut down. When controlling for
plant size, ￿rms with larger capacity shares more likely close locations. Deily
(1991) analyzes the steel industry in the U.S., where small and less pro￿table
plants are shut down ￿rst. Sta⁄ord (1991) shows for multi-unit ￿rms in the
Cincinatti region that manufacturing plant closure selection is mainly based
on lack of pro￿tability and inappropriate plant size. Based on U.K. data,
Kirkham and Watts (1997) report that low-pro￿table plants within multi-
unit manufacturing ￿rms are more likely to be shut down but appropriate
pro￿ts do not assure plant survival. Watts and Kirkham (1999) consider
data on U.K. multi-plant ￿rms. They ￿nd that small locations are shut ￿rst.
Richbell and Watts (2000) analyze four cases of international multi-unit ￿rms
(Hoover, JVC, Siemens, Avesta She¢ eld). In each of these cases, one of two
plants has to be closed. Interestingly, in two cases the plant is retained
that has the same location as the ￿rm￿ s headquarter; in the two other cases
7signi￿cant ￿nancial aid comes from the government of the plant that wins
survival. In their study on the U.S. manufacturing industry, Bernard and
Jensen (2007) show that plants of multi-unit ￿rms and of U.S. multinationals
are much larger, older and more productive than plants of single-unit ￿rms.
After having controlled for these plant characteristics, plants of multi-unit
or multinational ￿rms turn out to have a higher shutdown probability than
single plants. Hence, ￿rms with multiple heterogeneous units typically adjust
production by closing the least pro￿table locations.
The third class of related literature deals with international competition
and governmental intervention.11 Brander and Spencer (1985) address the
topic of export subsidies for domestic ￿rms. Since subsidizing is rational
from a single country￿ s point of view, a subsidy game between two coun-
tries will have a prisoners￿ -dilemma like outcome where both countries de-
cide to support their local ￿rms although they would collectively gain from
not subsidizing. Brainard and Martimort (1997) introduce incomplete in-
formation into the Brander-Spencer model. They show that asymmetric
information undermines the strategic advantage of precommitment via gov-
ernmental intervention. Dixit and Kyle (1985) analyze the strategic role of
governmental intervention concerning market entry, where a ￿rm can either
be protected or deterred. Again, a prisoners￿ -dilemma outcome is possible.
Konrad (2000) considers competition in trade that is modeled as an all-pay
auction. He shows that in the equilibrium with strategic trade policies the
countries are better o⁄ than in the equilibrium without governmental inter-
vention. Brainard (1994) considers the case of two ￿rms that compete in an
international industry. She highlights the welfare losses that follow from gov-
ernments aiding their local ￿rms to prevent market exits. As a consequence a
socially wasteful order of market exit may arise. Cassing and Hillman (1986)
address just the opposite case. In their approach, a declining industry may
lead to a decline in governmental support for the domestic shriveling ￿rm,
which is less important relative to other local ￿rms and industries. On an
aggregate level, the whole declining industry may collapse. All these papers
discuss a situation with independent ￿rms that compete against each other
11For an overview see Brander (1995).
8and are supported by their respective governments. However, the papers do
not consider the case of a multi-plant ￿rm with a single employer, which
takes center stage in this paper.
3 The Basic Model
We consider a ￿rm that is owned by employer E and consists of two plants
h and l. Plant h is more productive than plant l since the former one has
high-productive workers (h-type workers) whereas plant l only employs low-
productive ones (l-type workers).12 Thus, each plant employs a homogeneous
workforce.13 The type of the plant and, hence, the type of a worker are
common knowledge (e.g., due to formal quali￿cations or given degrees of
schooling). Plant p (p = h;l) consists of np > 0 workers of type p so that the
two plants may also di⁄er in size. For simplicity all players are assumed to
be risk neutral.14
Given these initial employment relationships, we focus on two periods
in the lifetime of the ￿rm. In each period, an operating plant p (p = h;l)
yields regular pro￿ts ￿p with ￿h > ￿l > 0 (i.e., the plant with the more
productive workforce has higher pro￿ts). These pro￿ts are shared between E
and the np workers. The workforce gets the share ￿p 2 (0;1) which is equally
distributed among the workers. The part (1 ￿ ￿p)￿p is earned by employer
E. It is important to emphasize that we do not consider those incentives
and optimal contracts that lead to pro￿ts ￿p and their distribution between
the workforce and the employer according to ￿p and 1 ￿ ￿p, respectively.
Instead, we focus on the possible consequences that result from a negative
12For example, the workforces di⁄er in their human capital endowments.
13The simplifying assumption of homogeneous workforces allows to use the same sub-
script p for the plant type and the corresponding worker type. This assumption sketches a
more realistic situation where one plant has more high-productive workers than the other
plant.
14Since we focus on incentive and selection issues within given employment relation-
ships and do not discuss possible contract o⁄ers by employer E it is not important to
introduce contractual frictions like risk aversion or limited liability. However, when an-
alyzing endogenously chosen incentives in Section 5 we also discuss the case of limited
liability.
9shock during the ￿rst period for given employment relationships. This shock
forces E to shut down one of his two plants at the end of the ￿rst period.
In the time span from the shock till the end of period one, each worker pi
of plant p (p = h;l; i = 1;:::;np) can choose additional e⁄ort api ￿ 0 to
in￿ uence plant p￿ s ￿rst-period extra pro￿ts, denoted by ￿p. The extra pro￿ts
￿p are not veri￿able by a third party so that E cannot use direct incentive
schemes (like bonuses) that are contingent on ￿p. However, it is veri￿able
whether plant h has performed better than l (i.e., ￿h > ￿l) or vice versa (i.e.,
￿h < ￿l).15 E⁄ort choices cannot be observed by employer E or a third party.
Let Ap :=
Pnp
i=1 api denote collective extra e⁄ort of the workforce in plant p.
The impact of collective e⁄ort on realized pro￿ts ￿p is characterized by the









and ￿p 2 (0;1) as productivity parameter where larger values
indicate higher productivity.
We make use of the spanning condition introduced by Grossman and


















fL (￿p) with ￿(Ap) 2 (0;1] being strictly in-
creasing, concave and twice di⁄erentiable, and fL (￿p)=fH (￿p) satisfying the
monotone likelihood ratio property. The distributions FH (￿p) and FL (￿p)
have di⁄erent means ￿H and ￿L (< ￿H), respectively, but the same sup-
port [￿; ￿ ￿]. Exerting e⁄ort entails costs on a worker described in mone-
tary terms by the function c(api) with c0 (api);c00 (api) > 0;8api > 0, and
c0 (0) = c(0) = 0. For comparative statics, sometimes we make use of a
parameterized version of the model with ￿(Ap) = ￿Ap (￿ 2 (0;1)) and
c(api) = ￿
2a2
pi with ￿ > 0.16
In the second period, the workers of the closed plant ^ p 2 fh;lg get
their respective reservation values ￿ v^ p ￿ 0. The workers of the other plant
15That is, a third party only has limited information. It lacks cardinal pro￿t informa-
tion but can verify ordinal performance. In Section 5, we also consider the case of an
unveri￿able ranking of extra pro￿ts.
16To guarantee that ￿(Ap) 2 (0;1] we assume that ￿ is su¢ ciently small and ￿ su¢ ciently
large. The assumption of a linear ￿(￿)-function is also referred to as the Linear Distribution
Function Condition (LDFC); see Hart and Holmstr￿m (1987), p. 84.
10p 2 fh;lgnf^ pg are still employed by E and realize second-period pro￿ts ￿p.
Again, these pro￿ts ￿p are shared between the np workers and employer E
according to ￿p and 1￿￿p. We assume that it is more attractive for a worker
to be employed by E than to be dismissed:
￿^ p
n^ p￿^ p > ￿ v^ p (^ p = h;l). Further-
more, we assume that E always prefers to shut down the less productive





characterizes a p-type worker. Let
each component of (￿h;￿h; ￿ vh;￿h) be larger than the respective component
of (￿l;￿l; ￿ vl;￿l). Hence, we assume that higher productivity of a worker
leads to higher expected extra pro￿ts in the ￿rst period (given a certain
e⁄ort level), higher bargaining power, a higher reservation value17 and higher
regular pro￿ts.
Employer E has to choose between two alternatives for the remaining part
of period one after the shock: (1) E can organize a collective tournament
between plants h and l and shut down the tournament loser after period one
(shutdown contest). In that case, E would bene￿t from the extra incentives
generated by the collective tournament. However, since the winner and the
loser of the tournament are veri￿able, E must close the more productive
plant h if the less productive unit l wins the tournament. (2) When the
shock occurs, E can decide to shut down the less productive plant l for sure.
This alternative would prevent any selection failure at the cost of zero extra
incentives. In order to highlight the incentive and selection e⁄ects of plant-
closing competition we neglect the existence of other possible incentive and
selection schemes.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, nature chooses (￿h;￿h; ￿ vh;￿h)
and (￿l;￿l; ￿ vl;￿l) from two probability distributions, with the distribution
for (￿h;￿h; ￿ vh;￿h) taking strictly higher values than that for (￿l;￿l; ￿ vl;￿l).
Thereafter, the negative shock occurs and the employer E has do decide
whether to organize a collective tournament (alternative (1)) or to shut down
plant l for sure (alternative (2)). If E has chosen alternative (1), a collective
tournament between plants h and l starts where the workers decide on their
17Thus, we implicitly assume that a worker￿ s human capital is not completely plant-
speci￿c or ￿rm-speci￿c.
11optimal e⁄ort levels.
4 Solution to the Basic Model
4.1 Shutdown Contest between the Plants
If E prefers to organize a tournament between plants h and l, worker pi of















￿^ pjA^ p;￿^ p
￿
d￿^ p ￿ c(api)
where ^ p denotes the other plant. In any case, worker pi has to bear his e⁄ort
costs c(api) and receives at least his reservation value ￿ vp in the second period.










￿^ pjA^ p;￿^ p
￿
d￿^ p
plant p wins the tournament so that worker pi is not dismissed and addition-
ally gets
￿p
















￿^ pjA^ p;￿^ p
￿
d￿^ p ￿ c
0 (api) = 0


















18Since regular ￿rst-period pro￿ts, ￿p, do not in￿ uence workers￿behavior they can be
skipped in the objective function.
19Note that the second-order condition is always satis￿ed.
12Note that the ￿rst integral is zero:
Z ￿ ￿
￿


























for X = H;L, and
Z ￿ ￿
￿












[FH (￿^ p)fL (￿^ p) + FL (￿^ p)fH (￿^ p)]d￿^ p = 1: (4)

























FH (￿^ p)fL (￿^ p)d￿^ p =: ￿F > 0
13where ￿F > 0 follows from the monotone likelihood ratio property.20 Since
from (5) it is obvious that all workers of plant p choose identical e⁄orts, we
have the following result:
Proposition 1 In the tournament, each worker of plant p (p = h;l) chooses
e⁄ort a￿




























(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L: (7)





















Equation (6) shows that a worker￿ s optimal e⁄ort increases in his bar-
gaining power ￿p, in the second-period pro￿ts ￿p and in productivity ￿p,
but decreases in his reservation value ￿ vp, which de￿nes his fall-back position
when his plant loses the collective tournament. Furthermore, optimal e⁄ort
decreases in the number of co-workers (i.e., @a￿
p=@np < 0). This result is
based on two e⁄ects. First, there is the well-known free-rider e⁄ect indicated
by
￿p
np￿p, which arises here because one plant ￿ghts as a team against the
other plant. Within this ￿ght, marginal extra income from winning the col-
lective tournament decreases in plant size whereas individual marginal costs
are not in￿ uenced by np. Second, even without incentive problems the work-
force would prefer an individual e⁄ort level for each worker that decreases
in np for pure technological reasons. This technology e⁄ect is indicated by
20Since the monotone likelihood ratio property implies ￿rst-order stochastic domi-
nance (e.g., Wolfstetter 1999, p. 139) we have
R ￿ ￿
￿ Y (￿^ p)[fH (￿^ p) ￿ fL (￿^ p)]d￿^ p > 0 for
any increasing function Y (￿). Using Y (￿^ p) = FH (￿^ p) and (3), immediately leads to R ￿ ￿







and arises from the concavity of function ￿(￿) ￿implying decreas-
ing marginal returns ￿in connection with a uniform convex cost function for
each worker.21
Proposition 1 points out that collective e⁄ort by the whole workforce of
plant p, npa￿
p, plays a prominent role for the outcome of the tournament.












The expression consists of two terms. The ￿rst one, a￿
p, is positive and can be
called quantity e⁄ect since collective e⁄ort will increase by a￿
p if the number
of workers is increased by an additional one. The second term is negative due
to the free-rider e⁄ect and the technology e⁄ect, described in the paragraph
before. Without further specifying the underlying functions it is not clear
which e⁄ect dominates.
Note that according to (8) the more productive plant may have a lower
probability of winning the collective tournament than the less productive one
(i.e., ￿h￿(nha￿
h) < ￿l￿(nla￿
l)). In particular, this is possible if productivi-
ties ￿h and ￿l do not di⁄er too much. If now the free-rider e⁄ect and the
technology e⁄ect dominate (are dominated by) the quantity e⁄ect, the more
productive plant will be less likely to win the collective tournament than the
low productive plant if the former one is su¢ ciently larger (smaller) than the
latter one.
For the parameterized version of the model with ￿(Ap) = ￿Ap and
c(api) = ￿
2a2
pi we get a clear-cut result. Optimal e⁄ort of a worker employed
21In other words, given a ￿rst marginal unit of e⁄ort exerted by all workers of plant p,
the next marginal unit has lower marginal collective returns if np+1 instead of np workers
have exerted the ￿rst marginal unit. However, marginal individual costs are identical for
all workers of a certain plant and not in￿ uenced by np. See also ￿rst-best e⁄orts below
described by (11).
22Although plant size np is an integer, for simplicity it is treated as being continuous
when doing comparative statics.


















￿l￿l ￿ nl￿ vl
￿h￿h ￿ nh￿ vh
:
Here, the technology e⁄ect is completely eliminated (i.e., marginal returns of
￿(Ap) are constant) and the free-rider e⁄ect dominates the quantity e⁄ect so
that the more productive plant is less likely to win the collective tournament
the larger its workforce.
4.2 The Employer￿ s Decision
The employer can either close plant l for sure or select plants via a collective
tournament with the loser being shut down. He will prefer a shutdown contest
if the resulting expected extra pro￿ts plus his expected second-period payo⁄s
exceed his sure second-period payo⁄s from running plant h:
￿h￿(nha
￿
h)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L + ￿l￿(nla
￿
l)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L
+(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ Ph + (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l ￿ Pl > (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h:
Rewriting the inequality immediately gives the following result:
Proposition 2 Employer E prefers to organize a shutdown contest between















l)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L: (9)
The left-hand side shows the expected costs from using a collective tour-
nament: With probability 1
2 ￿ [￿h￿(nha￿
h) ￿ ￿l￿(nla￿
l)]￿F plant l wins so
16that E￿ s second-period payo⁄is (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l instead of (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h. The right-
hand side describes the bene￿t of additional incentives via the tournament.
There is the following trade-o⁄: The higher the winning probability of
plant h (i.e., the higher [￿h￿(nha￿
h) ￿ ￿l￿(nla￿
l)]￿F) the less likely a selec-
tion failure when relying on selection via the shutdown contest and, hence,
the more likely a contest is used.23 However, in case of a contest we still
have a positive failure probability, which would not be the case if E forgoes
to use a shutdown contest. In other words, the failure probability (i.e., the
probability that plant h is closed) may be discontinuous in ￿h￿(nha￿
h): If
￿h￿(nha￿
h) is very small, then condition (9) will rather not be satis￿ed and
the failure probability is zero. If ￿h￿(nha￿
h) increases and exceeds a certain








￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l] = [￿h￿(nha￿
h) + ￿l￿(nla￿
l)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L) condition
(9) becomes satis￿ed so that E now prefers to organize a contest, imply-
ing a positive failure probability. If ￿h￿(nha￿
h) further increases, this failure
probability will monotonically decrease.24
5 Separating Selection and Incentives
Since the realizations of ￿l and ￿h are unveri￿able, employer E cannot write
incentive contracts based on extra pro￿ts. However, he can use relative-
compensation schemes (i.e., rank-order tournaments) as discussed in the sec-
tion before. In Section 4, selection and incentive issues were strictly inter-
related within a shutdown contest: On the one hand, if E wants to make
use of extra incentives due to plant-closing competition, the corresponding
collective tournament also determines which plant must be closed. On the
other hand, if E wants to close the low-productive plant for sure, no extra
incentives can arise.
In this section, we analyze the case of separating the selection decision
23This means, the more likely nature chooses a parameter constellation that satis￿es
condition (9).
24Note that it is also possible that condition (9) even holds when plant h is less likely
to win the tournament than plant l (i.e., ￿h￿(nha￿
h) < ￿l￿(nla￿
l )). Such constellation
requires that expected extra pro￿ts in period one are su¢ ciently large.
17from the outcome of the tournament so that the tournament can now be op-
timally designed for generating incentives: Theoretically, when the negative
shock occurs employer E can at the same time announce to close plant l at
the end of the ￿rst period and to give a winner prize w1 to plant p and a
loser prize w2 ￿ w1 to plant ^ p if ￿p > ￿^ p (p; ^ p = h;l; p 6= ^ p). Tournament
prizes are equally shared between the workers of the respective plant. E￿ s
announcements ensure optimal plant closing without in￿ uencing endogenous
tournament incentives. In the following, we will discuss whether E always
bene￿ts from such separation of selection and incentives.
We assume that E designs optimal tournaments prizes under the con-
straint that workers must earn nonnegative expected incomes from partici-
pating in the collective tournament. This participation constraint seems real-
istic as no worker can be forced to accept any additional incentive scheme in
case of a negative shock. Given this participation constraint, we distinguish
two cases: In Subsection 5.1, we address the case where E can freely choose
tournament prizes. Thus, E is allowed to choose even negative prizes as long
as workers￿expected extra incomes are not negative. Since negative prizes
are feasible, we refer to this scenario as the case of unlimited liability. In
Subsection 5.2, negative tournament prizes are not allowed so that E cannot
charge entrance fees from the workers for participating in the tournament.
In other words, workers are protected by limited liability.25 In both subsec-
tions, we di⁄erentiate between two scenarios. First, we consider the situation
of the basic model in Section 3 with the ranking of extra pro￿ts ￿l and ￿h
being veri￿able (i.e., the winner of the tournament is veri￿able). Second, we
analyze the consequences that arise when the pro￿t ranking is not veri￿able.
To guarantee a strictly concave objection function of employer E, we make
the technical assumption that c0 (ap)=￿
0 (npap) is a strictly convex function
of ap with ￿
0 (0) > 0.
25Hence, in both subsections, we implicitly assume that workers have already consumed
their regular ￿rst-period incomes,
￿p
np￿p, which therefore can neither be extracted by
negative tournament prizes nor be used for liability purposes.
185.1 Unlimited Liability
Before solving the two-stage game with E choosing tournament prizes at
stage 1 and a collective tournament for given prizes at stage 2, we compute
the workers￿￿rst-best e⁄orts as a benchmark solution: Without any incentive
problem each worker pi of plant p (p = h;l) maximizes the welfare of his
plant consisting of expected extra pro￿ts (see (7) in Proposition 1) minus
















The ￿rst-order condition yields26
￿p￿
0




(￿H ￿ ￿L) = c
0 (api):















Now, we can solve the two-stage game where E designs optimal incentives
at stage 1. Note that E will choose type-dependent tournament prizes for
both plants: w
p
1 will be the winner prize and w
p
2 the loser prize of plant
p (p = h;l). For example, if plant h wins (i.e., ￿h > ￿l) its workforce will
receive wh
1 whereas the workers of plant l get wl
2. Such type-dependent prizes
are feasible under the assumptions of the basic model where the winner of
the tournament is veri￿able. Without veri￿able winner or pro￿t ranking,





2 independent of true plant performances in order to
save labor costs. Since plants anticipate E￿ s behavior, incentives would be
26Since the welfare function per worker is strictly concave the ￿rst-order condition is
su¢ cient to describe ￿rst-best e⁄ort.


















so that the sum of prizes does not depend on the outcome of the tourna-
ment, type-dependent prizes would still be feasible even if the identity of
the tournament winner (i.e., relative plant performances) were not veri￿able.
Note that condition (12) only requires that each plant faces the same prize
spread. Hence, when designing optimal tournament prizes, type-dependent
prizes in combination with (12) leaves more freedom to E than uniform tour-
nament prizes. In the following, we will di⁄erentiate between the two cases
of veri￿able and unveri￿able pro￿t ranking.
To see that E typically bene￿ts from type-dependent prizes, let for the
moment nh = nl so that a higher productivity of plant h is not outweighed by
countervailing technology e⁄ects (i.e., we unambiguously have aFB
h > aFB
l ).
In this situation, under uniform tournament prizes w1 = wh
1 = wl
1 and w2 =
wh
2 = wl
2 the workers of the high-productive plant will always earn positive
rents. Due to higher productivity, plant h can achieve the same winning
probability in the tournament as plant l at lower e⁄ort costs. Hence, if E
chooses (w1;w2) to extract all rents from the workforce of plant l, the workers
of the other plant h will unambiguously receive positive expected incomes
from tournament participation. However, under type-dependent tournament
prizes E might optimally ￿ne-tune loser prizes wh
2 and wl
2 in order to extract











np for ￿ vp in equation (6), optimal worker








0 (npap) = c
0 (ap): (13)
The participation constraint guarantees that each worker￿ s expected extra






















￿ Pp ￿ c(ap) ￿ 0 (14)
with Pp denoting the winning probability of plant p according to equation
(8). Recall that expected pro￿ts from the collective tournament are given by























subject to the incentive constraint (13) and the participation constraint (14).
If the tournament winner is unveri￿able, we have to add constraint (12) to
E￿ s optimization problem. Letting (a￿
h;a￿
l) denote optimal e⁄orts, we get the
following results:
Proposition 3 (a) If the tournament winner is veri￿able, employer E will
implement a￿
p = aFB
p (p = h;l). (b) If the winner of the tournament is









l ; for nh = nl
employer E implements a￿
p = aFB
p (p = h;l). Under both (a) and (b), E
prefers separating selection and incentives and announcing closure of plant l
to a shutdown contest.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 describes the employer￿ s solution to his incentive problem
when plant l is closed for sure and tournament prizes are endogenously cho-
sen. In case of a veri￿able tournament winner, ￿rst-best e⁄orts are imple-
mented although contestants are heterogeneous. The asymmetric competi-
tion between plants h and l can be counterbalanced by appropriately adjusted




2 are used by E to implement
e¢ cient e⁄orts for each plant, whereas type-dependent loser prizes w
p
2 serve
as a rent-extraction device. If the tournament winner is unveri￿able, the
additional restriction (12) forces E to apply the same prize spread to each
21plant. As a consequence, ￿rst-best implementation for both plants becomes
impossible as long as they di⁄er in size. Since type-dependent loser prizes
are again ￿ne-tuned by E to extract all rents from the two plants, he gets
the full surplus. Depending on plant productivities ￿p (p = h;l) and the
technology e⁄ect mentioned in Subsection 4.1, he therefore chooses the low-
est possible distortion from ￿rst-best incentives, resulting in one workforce
supplying ine¢ ciently small e⁄ort and the other workforce ine¢ ciently large
e⁄ort.
The proposition also compares separation of selection and incentives to
combining both via a shutdown contest. In that contest, the exogenously
given incentives (i.e.,
￿p￿p
np ￿ ￿ vp)27 can be supplemented by optimally chosen
winner and loser prizes. The results point out that under unlimited liabil-
ity of the workers employer E is always better o⁄ separating selection and
incentives, irrespective of whether the winner of the tournament is veri￿-
able or not. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that, in case of veri￿ability,
both separating and combining lead to ￿rst-best incentives, but only sepa-
rating guarantees closing of plant l for sure. In case of unveri￿ability, both
separating and combining guarantee shutdown of the low-productive plant,
but separating generates strictly higher incentives than combining. However,
negative tournament prizes seem to be rather unrealistic. The following sub-
section deals with the more realistic situation of workers that are protected
by limited liability.
5.2 Limited Liability
Under limited liability, negative tournament prizes are not feasible any longer.




2 ￿ 0 (p = h;l) has two direct implica-
tions for E￿ s optimization problem when separating selection from incentives.
First, the participation constraint (14) can be neglected: Since ￿(0) > 0 and
c(0) = 0, each worker can ensure himself a strictly positive expected income
from participating in the tournament and choosing zero e⁄ort. In other
words, each worker earns a nonnegative rent under the optimal tournament
27See (6).
22design. Second, optimal loser prizes are zero since wh
2 and wl
2 increase E￿ s
expected labor costs and decrease workers￿incentives (see (13)). Therefore,
















0 (npap) = c
0 (ap) for p = h;l
if the tournament winner is veri￿able. Unveri￿ability of the tournament
winner adds condition (12) to E￿ s problem, which immediately implies wh
1 =
wl
1 =: w1. In spite of skipping the participation constraint, the solution to
the employer￿ s problem (15) is not trivial since winner prize w
p
1 determines
the incentives of workforce p as well as the expected labor costs for both
plants (via Ph and Pl). Recall that without any further assumption it is not
clear whether ￿rst-best e⁄ort in plant h is larger than that in plant l or vice
versa since productivities ￿p and technology e⁄ects may work into opposite
directions (see (11)). Hence, in order to guarantee that ￿rst-best e⁄ort is
higher in plant h that in plant l we impose the additional restriction nh = nl.
Let (a￿
h;a￿







winner prizes. Then we obtain the following results:
Proposition 4 Let nh = nl =: n. (a) If the tournament winner is veri￿able,







l ; if ￿h￿￿l ! 0 then a￿
p < aFB
p (p = h;l). There exists a cut-o⁄ value
￿ ￿ with ￿ ￿ >
1￿￿l
1￿￿h so that E prefers plant selection via a shutdown contest
to a separation of selection and incentives if
￿h
￿l ￿ ￿ ￿. (b) If the tournament
winner is unveri￿able, then a￿
p < aFB
p (p = h;l). Employer E always prefers
separation of selection and incentives.
Proof. See Appendix.
The ￿ndings of Proposition 4 clearly di⁄er from those of Proposition 3
(unlimited liability). If the tournament winner is veri￿able, now employer E
does not implement ￿rst-best e⁄orts any longer although he is able to ￿ne-
tune incentives for each type of plant. Under limited liability, the plants￿
23workforces earn strictly positive rents. Hence, employer E prefers to distort
incentives away from ￿rst-best in order to minimize workers￿rents. He does
not implement excessive e⁄ort for the high-productive plant at the cost of
ine¢ ciently small e⁄ort by workforce l. If productivities are rather similar, E
unambiguously prefers to induce less than e¢ cient incentives for both plants.
As pointed out by Proposition 3(b), in case of an unveri￿able tournament
winner, E induces ￿rst-best incentives under unlimited liability as long as
plant sizes are identical. However, according to Proposition 4(b), E bene￿ts
from implementing ine¢ ciently low e⁄ort levels for both plants if workers are
protected by limited liability.
The cases of unlimited liability and limited liability also di⁄er concerning
employer E￿ s preferences for a separation of selection and incentive issues. If
the tournament winner is unveri￿able, the ￿ndings of Propositions 3 and 4
coincide. In both propositions, employer E cannot credibly commit to close
the tournament loser if selection and incentives are combined via a shutdown
contest. This problem completely erases incentives. Hence, it is always
better for E to close plant l for sure and implement ine¢ ciently low e⁄ort
levels by a tournament that is purely used as incentive scheme. However,
the results of Propositions 3 and 4 sharply di⁄er, if the tournament winner
is veri￿able. If workers are protected by limited liability, E will prefer to
combine selection and incentives if regular pro￿ts ￿h and ￿l do not di⁄er
too much. In this situation, plant selection is not a great issue but workers￿
second-period rents from winning the shutdown contest can be very useful to
substitute ￿rst-period tournament prizes. Thus, by combining selection and
incentives via a shutdown contest employer E reduces implementation costs.
If this reduction is su¢ ciently large, the employer will accept the risk to shut
down the high-productive plant when losing the tournament. Proposition
4(a) also points out that the stronger the plants di⁄er in their bargaining
power the more likely E will rely on a shutdown contest. Intuitively, the
larger ￿h the higher the share in regular pro￿ts that goes to workforce h in
the second period. Therefore, the employer will be less interested in selection
e¢ ciency since most of the e¢ ciency gains are distributed to the workers.
24To sum up, if the tournament winner is veri￿able by a third party ￿as as-
sumed in the basic model ￿and implementation costs are an important issue,
employer E will prefer to use a collective tournament for both selection and
creating incentives although he is able to solve the two problems separately.
Due to E￿ s preference in favor of a shutdown contest, again it is possible that
E ex-post reacts to the negative shock by closing the high-productive plant.
6 Governmental Intervention
In this section, we extend the basic model by introducing two additional
players.28 We assume that the two plants h and l are located in two di⁄erent
countries with governments Gh and Gl, respectively. Since unemployment
of workers leads to costs for Gh and Gl (e.g., loss of income taxes, pay of
unemployment bene￿ts), each of the new players is interested in protecting
its plant against being shut down. In particular, we assume that each country
has to bear costs ￿ > 0 per unemployed worker.
Since workers di⁄er in productivity, they are also assumed to di⁄er in
their reemployment opportunities: Let ￿p 2 (0;1) denote the reemployment
probability of a p-type worker with ￿h > ￿l (p = h;l); that is with probability
￿p the respective worker immediately gets another job in period 2 without
generating costs ￿,29 but with probability 1 ￿ ￿p the worker remains unem-
ployed during period 2 and entails costs ￿ for government Gp.30 Altogether,





(￿h;￿h; ￿ vh;￿h;￿h) > (￿l;￿l; ￿ vl;￿l;￿l).
We di⁄erentiate between two cases. First, we allow that the governments
can freely bid for the decision right which plant to be closed, that is a gov-
ernment o⁄ers employer E a certain amount of ￿nancial aid if the domestic
plant is kept and the other plant shut down. Second, such auctioning of
28Thus, we are back in the setup without endogenous tournament prizes.
29In that case, a worker receives his reservation value ￿ vp at his new employer.
30Costs ￿ contain unemployment bene￿ts so that a worker again receives his reservation
value ￿ vp in period 2. Note that this assumption as well as the assumption that reservation
values for period 2 only depend on the worker￿ s type but not on the status of a worker
(i.e., employed versus unemployed) are not crucial but only made for simplicity.
25decision rights is forbidden (e.g., by an international competition agency)
and governments can only assist their respective plants during the collective
tournament by using indirect subsidies like public contracts that are given
to the plant.
6.1 Bidding for Plant Closing
Suppose that condition (9) is satis￿ed so that in the basic model E would
organize a shutdown contest. Now we allow the two governments Gh and Gl
bidding for the right to decide which plant is closed. There are three possi-
ble outcomes: Either E accepts Gh￿ s o⁄er and closes plant l, or E accepts
Gl￿ s o⁄er and closes plant h, or E rejects the o⁄ers of both governments
and runs a collective tournament with the loser being shut down. For his
decision between these three alternatives E has to choose bidder-speci￿c re-
serve prices because acceptance of Gh￿ s bid leads to di⁄erent consequences
than accepting Gl￿ s o⁄er. In the ￿rst case, E￿ s payo⁄ in the second period
is (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h, whereas in the second case he will earn (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l. How-
ever, in either case employer E forgoes expected extra pro￿ts from running
a tournament. Hence, E￿ s reserve price for government Gh is
rh := ￿h￿(nha
￿
h)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L + ￿l￿(nla
￿
l)(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L
+(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ Ph + (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l ￿ Pl ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h;
which is unambiguously positive since inequality (9) for the use of a shutdown





l)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L
￿Pl ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l]:





l)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L
+ Ph ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l] = rh + [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l]:
26The relation rl > rh immediately follows from the fact that closing plant h
has worse consequences for E than closing plant l.
In a next step, we have to calculate the willingness-to-pay for each bidder,
which is identical to the expected costs from plant closing for the respective







Note that both constellations (1 ￿ ￿h)￿nh 7 (1 ￿ ￿l)￿nl are possible; how-
ever, if nl ￿ nh then we will unambiguously have kh < kl.
Before solving the auction game between E, Gh and Gl, we must further
specify the rules of the auction. Note that we have a situation with complete
information. Hence, the parties can freely bargain without any friction, which
would lead to the same outcome as the following asymmetric English auction
with a tie-breaking rule: Bidders Gp alternately announce o⁄ers bp (p = h;l).
Alternate bids must be exceeding in the sense that given Gp￿ s bid bp ￿ rp, the
other bidder G^ p can only o⁄er b^ p ￿ r^ p if b^ p￿r^ p ￿ bp￿rp. The auction ends if
neither bidder wants to increase his o⁄er. The party with the ￿nal bid must
pay this bid to E. If both bidders o⁄er ￿nal bids, that is b^ p ￿ r^ p = bp ￿ rp,
the employer E will sell to the bidder with the higher spread kp ￿ rp. The
auction leads to the following outcome:
Proposition 5 (a) Let (1 ￿ ￿l)nl > (1 ￿ ￿h)nh. If kp < rp (p = h;l),
then E still organizes a shutdown contest between the plants. If kp < rp and
k^ p > r^ p (p; ^ p = h;l, p 6= ^ p), then government Gp will not bid. Government
G^ p will bid r^ p and win the auction, if and only if r^ p < Pp ￿ k^ p; otherwise E
will run a contest (p; ^ p = h;l, p 6= ^ p). If kp > rp (p = h;l), then govern-
ment Gl (Gh) will win the auction and pay kh + [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l]
(kl ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l]) if kl ￿ rl > (<)kh ￿ rh.
(b) Let (1 ￿ ￿h)nh > (1 ￿ ￿l)nl. If kh < rh, then E still organizes a shut-
down contest. If kh > rh and kl < rl, employer E will run a contest given
that rh > Pl ￿kh; otherwise government Gh becomes active and wins the auc-
tion, paying rh. If rh < rl < kl < kh, then both governments are active in
the auction and Gh wins with bid kl ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l].
27Proof. See Appendix.
If the willingness-to-pay of both governments is low relative to the respec-
tive reserve prices, no bidding competition will occur and the less productive
plant will win the shutdown contest with positive probability. There are also
constellations where only one government bids for the decision right which
plant to be closed. In these cases, this government Gp knows that the other
bidder will drop and, hence, only bids its reserve price rp. If kp > rp (p = h;l),
both governments will be active in the auction. The successful bidder (i.e.,
the party with the higher spread kp ￿ rp) pays his reserve price rp plus the
opponent￿ s spread k^ p ￿ r^ p (p; ^ p = h;l; p 6= ^ p). Most interestingly, if the
government of the less productive plant has higher expected costs from plant
closing than the other government (i.e., (1 ￿ ￿l)nl > (1 ￿ ￿h)nh), there will
be cases where the former party asserts itself in the auction so that the more
productive plant is closed.
6.2 Subsidizing Plants in the Shutdown Contest
If direct bidding for plant closing is not allowed, the two governments may in-
directly support their plants by reducing business taxes for certain industries
or by o⁄ering public contracts, for example.31 In the following, we consider
such situation and assume that government Gp (p = h;l) can either support
its domestic plant in the shutdown contest (i.e., choose subsidy sp = s > 0)
or not (sp = 0). Subsidies typically lower plants￿costs or raise their produc-
tivities. Since we do not model the plants￿cost functions (excepting labor
costs), we will focus on the impact of a subsidy on a plant￿ s productivity.
In this subsection, we assume that plant p￿ s productivity in the shutdown
contest is described by ￿ (sp) ￿ ￿p (instead of ￿p) with ￿ (￿) 2 (0;1] being
monotonically increasing. We consider a two-stage game where the two gov-
ernments simultaneously decide on subsidizing at stage one. At the second
stage, the workers of both plants observe sh and sl and then decide on their
31Here, we consider temporary support during the collective tournament. Other mea-
sures like improving the public infrastructure in certain areas by building a new freeway
would also favor a plant p in the next period, thus increasing second-period pro￿ts ￿p.
28extra e⁄orts api.
The solution of the second stage is described by Proposition 1 after sub-
stituting ￿ (sp)￿￿p for ￿p: Given subsidy sp, a worker￿ s optimal e⁄ort in plant
p, a￿



















Plant p wins against plant ^ p (p; ^ p = h;l; p 6= ^ p) with probability




















p (sp) and Pp = Pp (sp;s^ p) indicate that optimal e⁄ort and
winning probability now depend on the governments￿subsidy choices.




￿npP^ p (s^ p;sp) + sp
with P^ p (s^ p;sp) as plant ^ p￿ s winning probability in the contest. For given s^ p,

















































Rewriting the inequality leads to the following result:32
Proposition 6 Government Gp (p = h;l) will subsidize plant p by investing












































Concerning government Gh, on the one hand a larger reemployment prob-
ability (￿h > ￿l) and a larger reservation value of the workers (￿ vh > ￿ vl) make
subsidizing less likely compared to government Gl. For these reasons, the
more productive plant may get less support than the less productive plant,
which decreases the survival probability of the more productive plant. On
the other hand, a larger productivity (￿h > ￿l), larger second-period pro￿ts
(￿h > ￿l) and a higher bargaining (￿h > ￿l) power work into the opposite
direction.











indicate the trade-o⁄ between the quantity ef-
fect on the one side and free-rider and technology e⁄ects on the other side
when plant size increases. But now, an additional e⁄ect arises from the ex-




￿np, which increase in plant size

















Thus, for small values of np the quantity e⁄ect and the shutdown-costs ef-
fect dominate the free-rider e⁄ect so that a large plant is more likely to be
supported by the government in its struggle to survive.33 However, for large
values of np the free-rider e⁄ect becomes dominant so that a large plant gets
less support than a small one. Intuitively, if a plant is very large the individ-
ual contribution of a single worker for the survival of his plant is negligible.
Hence, individual incentives tend to be destroyed so that ￿on the aggregate






Since the government anticipates this incentive disaster it will prefer to save
33Recall from Subsection 4.1 that the technology e⁄ect is absent in the parameterized
version.
30money by not subsidizing its domestic plant.
There is a further e⁄ect that could be relevant in practice and, there-
fore, may be integrated into the model: Sometimes a large plant is the main
employer in a certain region. If this plant is closed, the regional rate of
unemployment will signi￿cantly rise. In such situations, the reemployment
probability is a monotonically decreasing function of plant size (i.e., ￿p (np)
with ￿
0
p (np) < 0). This additional e⁄ect from regional labor markets would
make large plants more likely to be supported by the government in an in-
ternational struggle of plant closing.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze plant closing in a multi-unit ￿rm. In particular,
we compare plant closing via a shutdown contest with deterministic closing
of the least productive unit. A shutdown contest involves the possibility of
a selection failure (i.e., the more productive plant is closed), but o⁄ers the
opportunity to create additional incentives. If these incentive issues ￿includ-
ing the reduction of implementation costs in case of endogenous tournament
prizes and limitedly liable workers ￿dominate selection issues, the ￿rm will
prefer organizing a shutdown contest.
If the multi-plant ￿rm operates internationally, political interventions of
di⁄erent governments that try to help their domestic plants may be only one
of several interesting topics. The national context of the di⁄erent plants can
in￿ uence the ￿rm￿ s closing decision even without any governmental interven-
tion. If, for example, in one country unions have a strong impact on wages,
a rather productive plant located in that country may have a higher prob-
ability of being shut down than a low-productive plant with less unionized
workers. This aspect is also shown in the model discussed in the paper since
the workers￿bargaining power can be interpreted as a measure of unioniza-
tion. Then it becomes clear that strong unionization may distort the ￿rm￿ s
closing decision away from selection e¢ ciency since a signi￿cant part of the
corresponding e¢ ciency gains is distributed to the workers. The closing deci-
sion may also be in￿ uenced by network e⁄ects, not incorporated in the given
31model.34 In particular, the location of a ￿rm￿ s headquarter can have a large
impact on the plant-closing decision.35
For simplicity, information problems have been largely ignored in this
paper in order to focus on the key arguments for or against a shutdown
contest. Of course, incomplete information about the plants￿types can either
increase or reduce the attractiveness of a shutdown contest from the ￿rm￿ s
viewpoint. If, on the one hand, the ￿rm is poorly informed about the true
productivities of the di⁄erent plants, a shutdown contest may be optimal for
both incentive and selection purposes. On the other hand, if the governments
have information de￿cits when trying to support their domestic plants in
the shutdown contest, competition may be highly distorted by asymmetric
information, thus increasing the probability of a selection failure.
34For example, following the approach by Wintrobe and Breton (1986) managers may
be primarily interested to protect their investments in trust, thus distorting selection
e¢ ciency.
35For anecdotal evidence on the in￿ uence of labor unions and the location of the head-
quarter on the plant-closing decision see the cases reported by Richbell and Watts (2000).
32Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:




[FH (￿^ p)fL (￿^ p) ￿ FL (￿^ p)fL (￿^ p)]d￿^ p = ￿F
and a￿
p = api (i = 1;:::;np) so that A = npa￿
p. Implicitly di⁄erentiating (6)







































since ￿(￿) is concave and c(￿) is convex.





























(￿H ￿ ￿L) + ￿L:
Plant h￿ s probability of winning the shutdown contest is given by
Z ￿ ￿
￿


























[FH (￿l) ￿ FL (￿l)][fH (￿l) ￿ fL (￿l)]d￿l
| {z }












FL (￿l)[fH (￿l) ￿ fL (￿l)]d￿l:



























2 due to (3)
):
Using Z ￿ ￿
￿




































34Proof of Proposition 3:





































Hence, E￿ s maximizes





















subject to (13) and (14). At the optimum, the workers￿participation con-
straints will be binding: Since loser prizes w
p
2 decrease incentives and increase

























2 in (13) to implement e⁄orts a￿
p that maximize
[￿h￿(nhah) + ￿l￿(nlal)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L ￿ nhc(ah) ￿ nlc(al):
The ￿rst-order conditions for a￿
h and a￿
l coincide with equation (11), which
characterizes ￿rst-best e⁄orts.
(b) If the tournament winner is not veri￿able, constraint (12) forces E to




2 to each workforce.





[￿h￿(nhah) + ￿l￿(nlal)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L ￿ w
h







0 (npap) = c








Pp ￿ c(ap) ￿ 0 , w
p
2 + ￿wPp ￿ npc(ap) for p = h;l. (19)
Incentive constraint (18) shows that the uniform prize spread ￿w prevents
35E from ￿ne-tuning both workforces￿incentives independently of each other.
This restriction does not prevent ￿rst-best implementation as long as plants
employ the same number of workers (nh = nl). If plants di⁄er in size (i.e.,
nh 6= nl) overall ￿rst-best implementation becomes impossible (compare (11)
and (18)). However, E can still use type-dependent loser prizes wl
2 and wh
2 to
extract all rents from the two workforces and make participation constraints
(19) bind. Inserting w
p
2 + ￿wPp = npc(ap) (p = h;l) into E￿ s objective
function and combining the incentive constraints (18) for both plants leads
to the Lagrangian
L(ah;al) = [￿h￿(nhah) + ￿l￿(nlal)](￿H ￿ ￿L) + 2￿L











with ￿ as multiplier. The optimality conditions @L=@ah = 0 and @L=@al = 0
yield
￿h￿
0 (nhah)(￿H ￿ ￿L) ￿ c

































The left-hand sides of (20) and (21) are identical to the derivatives of the ￿rst-
best plant welfare functions (10) under symmetric worker behavior. If these
derivatives become zero they will describe ￿rst-best e⁄orts aFB
p (see (11))
since the plant welfare functions (10) are strictly concave. Thus, if ￿ < 0











If the tournament winner is veri￿able, separation of selection and in-
centives ensures optimal plant closing and induces ￿rst-best e⁄orts with E
receiving total ￿rst-best surplus (see above). In case of combining selection
36and incentives via a shutdown contest (i.e., the tournament loser is closed),
E can supplement exogenously given incentives
￿p
np￿p ￿ ￿ vp by additional en-












































0 (npap) = c
0 (ap): (23)
Obviously, from a pure incentive perspective we get the same outcome as










np ￿ ￿ vp
￿
￿F = (￿H ￿ ￿L) in order to implement ￿rst-best e⁄orts
(compare (11) and (23)) and loser prizes w
p
2 that make (14) just bind; hence,
the employer fully extracts workers￿rents. However, under a shutdown con-
test the less productive plant l is only closed with probability smaller than
one. Hence, altogether E is better o⁄ when separating selection and incen-
tives.
If the tournament winner is unveri￿able, separation again leads to optimal
plant closing for sure, but now E induces ine¢ cient incentives (see above).
Under a shutdown contest, the low-productive plant will also be closed for
sure: Since the tournament winner is not veri￿able, E will ex-post always
claim that plant h has performed better. However, as this optimal behavior of
the employer is anticipated by both workforces, the shutdown contest yields





2. Altogether, employer E again prefers separation of selection and
incentives.





￿p￿F￿0(nap) (p = h;l) into the employer￿ s objective function
(15) shows that E implements e⁄ort levels (a￿
h;a￿
l) that maximize































































= 0 , ￿l￿
0 (nal)
￿






























l cannot be true at the same time, we
can apply the following lemma, which will also be useful for proving result
(b):
Lemma 1 For any e⁄ort level a > 0 we have ￿(a) > 1.
Proof. Since c0 (a)=￿



























Hence, to prove the lemma it su¢ ces to show that a ￿ ￿
0 (na) < 1. Recall
that ￿(A) is assumed to be concave, which implies ￿
0 (A) ￿ A ￿ ￿(A). For
38A = na this inequality reads as ￿
0 (na) ￿ na ￿ ￿(na). Rewriting and using












which completes the proof.





l . In that case, the right-hand side of (25) is larger
than c0 (ah), because ￿h￿F < 1

























is zero for ah = aFB
h and al = aFB
l according to (11), and strictly negative
for ah > aFB
h and al < aFB
l , the left-hand side of equation (25) is equal to
or smaller than ￿h￿
0 (nah)(￿H ￿ ￿L). As ￿(￿) is concave and c(￿) convex,












￿ ￿ ! 0 so that the left-hand sides of (25)





(￿H ￿ ￿L) (p = h;l) whereas the right-hand




, which implies a￿
p < aFB
p .
Finally, consider E￿ s decision on whether separating selection and incen-
tives or not for the case of a veri￿able tournament winner. If, on the one
hand, E separates selection and incentives, his payo⁄ from the tournament
and the second period is ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h with ￿ being described by (24).
















0 (nap) = c
0 (ap) (p = h;l).
Call this alternative separation. If, on the other hand, E decides to select






















0 (nap) = c
0 (ap) (p = h;l).
Recall that ￿l < ￿h. Employer E would be strictly better o⁄from a shutdown
contest if







In this situation, the selection decision would not in￿ uence E￿ s second-period
payo⁄s. Hence, from a pure selection perspective E would be indi⁄erent be-
tween separation and shutdown contest. However, under a shutdown contest
E could always implement the same or even higher e⁄ort levels at lower costs
compared to separation. Let, in particular, wh￿
1 and wl￿
1 denote the optimal
winner prizes under separation and (a￿
h;a￿
l) the corresponding e⁄ort levels.
If w
p￿
1 > ￿p￿p ￿ n￿ vp (p 2 fh;lg), then E could implement (a￿
h;a￿
l) under a
shutdown contest as well and, at the same time, save implementation costs
￿p￿p ￿ n￿ vp at plant p. If w
p￿
1 < ￿p￿p ￿ n￿ vp (p 2 fh;lg), employer E would
even implement higher e⁄orts at plant p and save costs w
p￿
1 . Note that these
higher e⁄ort levels are not a problem for E. As workers earn strictly posi-
tive rents in the given setting with limited liability, these higher e⁄ort levels
would increase E￿ s pro￿ts and reduce the workers￿rents. If
￿h
￿l > ^ ￿, separa-
tion and shutdown contest will not yield identical second-period payo⁄s for
E. However, if
￿h
￿l is not too large compared to ^ ￿, employer E￿ s bene￿t from
saving implementation costs will be stronger than a possible disadvantage
from uncertain selection. In other words, there is a cut-o⁄ ￿ ￿ > ^ ￿ so that a
shutdown contest dominates separation from E￿ s point of view, if
￿h
￿l < ￿ ￿.
(b) Let w1 denote the uniform winner prize of both plants in case of an un-
40veri￿able winner. E￿ s maximization problem is described by the Lagrangian












0 (nal) ￿ c
0 (al)
￿
with #1 and #2 as multipliers. As optimality conditions we obtain
￿h￿

























0 (nal) = 0:




￿0(nap) in the ￿rst
two equations (p = h;l) and rewriting yields
￿h￿





















Since ￿p￿F < 1
2 (p = h;l) we obtain from the third equation that at least one




n is larger than one. Hence, using
Lemma 1, comparison of the ￿rst two equations with (11) points out that at
least one of the optimal e⁄orts a￿
h and a￿
l is smaller than the corresponding
￿rst-best level, due to the concavity of the welfare function per plant. Note

















p (p = h;l).
41If the tournament winner is not veri￿able, the same arguments hold as
in the last paragraph of the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, E always prefers
separation of selection and incentives to a shutdown contest.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Case (a) refers to the situation with government Gl having higher expected
costs from plant closing: kl > kh , (1 ￿ ￿l)nl > (1 ￿ ￿h)nh. Together
with rh < rl we have to di⁄erentiate between six possible constellations: If
kh < kl < rh < rl or kh < rh < kl < rl, neither government will bid for the
decision which plant to be closed since kp < rp (p = h;l). If rh < kh < kl < rl,
then government Gl will be passive. Government Gh bids its reserve price rh,
if and only if rh is smaller than the expected costs from remaining passive so
that E organizes a shutdown contest:
rh < Pl ￿ kh:
In case of kh < rh < rl < kl we have the opposite situation with Gh being
passive and Gl bidding rl, if and only if
rl < Ph ￿ kl:
In the two remaining constellations, rh < kh < rl < kl and rh < rl < kh < kl,
both bidders will be active. Note that E is indi⁄erent between the following
three outcomes: organizing a contest between the plants, selling the closing
decision to government Gl at price rl, and selling to Gh at price rh. However,
a situation with bl = rl and bh = rh cannot be an equilibrium. It would
be rational for the bidders to incrementally counterbid each other (i.e., Gp
bids bp = rp + " so that G^ p responds by o⁄ering b^ p = r^ p + 2"; now Gp bids
bp = rp + 3" and so on with " ! 0 and p; ^ p = h;l; p 6= ^ p). Upbidding stops
when one party G^ p has reached b^ p = r^ p + (k^ p ￿ r^ p) = k^ p. The other bidder
(i.e., the government with the higher spread kp ￿ rp) bids its reserve price
plus the opponent￿ s spread (i.e., bp = rp + (k^ p ￿ r^ p) = k^ p + rp ￿ r^ p with
rl ￿rh = (1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿(1 ￿ ￿l)￿l) and wins the auction by the tie-breaking
rule.
42Case (b) deals with kh > kl , (1 ￿ ￿h)nh > (1 ￿ ￿l)nl. If kl < kh <
rh < rl, both bidders remain passive. In the four situations kl < rh < kh < rl,
rh < kl < kh < rl, kl < rh < rl < kh and rh < kl < rl < kh bidder Gl is
passive. Gh will become active and bid rh, if and only if this reserve price is
smaller than the expected costs from accepting a shutdown contest:
rh < Pl ￿ kh:
Finally, if rh < rl < kl < kh there will be incremental counterbidding by
both governments, but Gh unambiguously wins due to kh￿rh > kl￿rl. The
winning bid is rh + (kl ￿ rl) = kl ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿h)￿h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)￿l].
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